We study the competitive effects of restricting direct access to secondary care by gatekeeping, focusing on the informational role of general practitioners (GPs). In the secondary care market there are two hospitals choosing quality and specialization. Patients, who are ex ante uninformed, can consult a GP to receive an (imperfect) diagnosis and obtain information about the secondary care market. We show that hospital competition is amplified by higher GP attendance but dampened by improved diagnosing accuracy. Therefore, compulsory gatekeeping may result in excessive quality competition and too much specialization, unless the mismatch costs and the diagnosing accuracy are sufficiently high. Second-best price regulation makes direct regulation of GP consultation redundant, but will generally not implement first-best.
Introduction
The UK and the Scandinavian countries are examples of countries where general practitioners (GPs) have a gatekeeping role in the health care system. Patients do not have direct access to secondary care. They need a referral from their (primary care) GP to get access to a hospital or a specialist. 1 In the US, several health maintenance organizations (HMOs) also practice gatekeeping. Recently, however, some HMOs have relaxed the restrictions on access to specialists (see, e.g., Ferris et al., 2001) . In Germany, patients need a referral to get access to a hospital and it has been on the political agenda to also restrict direct access to specialist care by giving GPs a gatekeeper role. The international experience with gatekeeping thus appears to be mixed: while some countries relax gatekeeping regulations (e.g., the US), others seem to move towards stricter rules (e.g., Germany). The current paper contributes to the discussion on gatekeeping by analyzing the competition effects that arise when GPs are equipped with a gatekeeping role.
In general, there are two main arguments for introducing gatekeeping in health care markets (see Scott, 2000) . First, it is usually claimed that gatekeepers contribute to cost control by reducing 'unnecessary' interventions. 2 Second, it is argued that secondary care is used more efficiently since 'GPs usually have better information than patients about the quality of care available from secondary care providers' (Scott, 2000 (Scott, , p. 1177 . In the present paper, we focus on the second argument, highlighting the fact that making this information available to patients changes the nature of competition between secondary care providers, which in turn affects the social desirability of gatekeeping.
As pointed out in a seminal paper by Arrow (1963) , uncertainty and various informational problems make health care markets distinctly different from most other markets. The present paper stresses the importance of non-price competition between health care providers, as well as the role of imperfect information in the relationship between patients and providers. Building on the familiar model of Hotelling (1929) , we consider a secondary care market with two providers (hospitals). In order to attract patients (and obtain third party payments) the hospitals have two strategic variables at their disposal: location and quality of care. We refer to location as the specialization or service mix at a hospital, though it may also be interpreted in geographical terms. Thus, hospitals engage in non-price competition in terms of both horizontal and vertical differentiation of services.
The major aim of the paper is to highlight the informational role of GP gatekeepers in secondary care markets. We assume that patients are ex ante uniformed about their specific diagnosis and the exact characteristics of the hospitals. Thus, if they access secondary care providers directly, their choices may be subject to substantial errors. First, a patient may end up in a poor match, i.e., he may choose the hospital that is less able to cure his disease. Second, he may decide to go to the hospital that provides the lower quality of care. To reduce the risk of choosing the 'wrong' hospital, patients may therefore (at some costs) consult a GP first. The GPs are informed agents (middlemen) and convey accurate information about hospital characteristics, i.e., quality and specialization. They also give attending patients a noisy diagnosis. Thus, the GPs are imperfect agents in the sense that diagnosing accuracy is not perfect. 3 We abstract from any moral hazard problems that may originate in the agency relationships between players. 4 When deciding whether to consult a GP or to approach a hospital directly, patients simply weigh the consulting costs against the reduction in (expected) mismatch costs due to better information.
The analysis is focused on two basic questions. (i) How does GP gatekeeping affect hospitals' incentives to specialize and to invest in quality? (ii) Is strict gatekeeping -i.e., no access to secondary care without a GP referral -socially desirable? The answers to these two questions are closely connected. Concerning the first question, we show that a higher GP attendance rate amplifies quality competition and induces the hospitals to specialize their services. The former is explained by the fact that informed patients are sensitive to quality differences, while uninformed patients are not. The latter is due the fact that hospitals can dampen quality competition by specializing their services. 5 Interestingly, the other information variable -diagnosing accuracy -has the exact opposite effect. When diagnosing accuracy is low, patients attending a GP put a larger weight on quality differences than hospital specializations, since the probability of a wrong diagnosis is high. As a consequence, improved diagnosing accuracy tends to weaken quality competition and, in turn, the corresponding incentives for specialization. However, improved diagnosing accuracy also increases the benefit of consulting a GP, leading to higher GP attendance, which, in turn, increases hospital competition. Thus, when the patients' decision of whether or not to attend a GP is endogenized, the latter (indirect) effect of improved diagnosing accuracy on hospital competition tends to counteract the former (direct) effect. 6 Regarding the second question, numerical simulations of our model suggest that strict gatekeeping is detrimental to welfare unless mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy are sufficiently high. The reason is that both low mismatch costs and low diagnosing accuracy trigger hospital competition. Since higher GP attendance has the same directional effect on competition, as explained above, strict gatekeeping tightens hospital competition even further. As a consequence, hospitals engage in excessive competition, resulting in too high quality and too much specialization from a welfare perspective. 7 The regulator (payer) determines the hospital reimbursement by setting a (prospective) price per treatment (or patient). We show that if second-best price regulation is available, then there is no scope for direct regulation of GP attendance. Thus, the treatment price is a sufficient instrument to induce second-best optimal quality and specialization of hospital care. Finally, we characterize the second-best equilibrium, showing that first-best is generally not achievable for the regulator.
The paper relates to both the general literature on spatial competition and the literature on (imperfect) competition in health care markets. The interaction between quality and location choices has been investigated by Economides (1989) under price competition and Brekke et al. (2006) under price regulation. 8 The present paper contributes to this literature by introducing imperfect information into the framework. As previously mentioned, we find that the hospitals' incentives to differentiate services crucially depend on the degree of information in the market. In particular, we find that the presence of uninformed consumers tends to soften the incentives for horizontal differentiation. In this respect our findings are in the spirit of Bester (1998) , who shows that quality competition may induce minimum differentiation -i.e., agglomeration at the market center -when consumers are uncertain about product quality and use observed prices to ascertain the quality of goods.
The paper also relates to the more general literature on transparency in imperfectly competitive markets. 9 Increased transparency on the consumer side of the market typically leads to intensified price competition and thus to a more socially desirable market outcome. Our paper contributes to this literature by analyzing the effects of improved transparency in markets that are characterized by non-price competition. In this case, more intense competition between firms does not necessarily improve social welfare. Improved market transparency consequently has ambiguous welfare effects. 10 Finally, our paper complements the multi-task agency literature on the economics of general practice, e.g., Garcia Mariñoso and Jelovac (2003) , Malcomson (2004) and González (2006) . These papers focus on the dual nature of GP activity, namely, on diagnosing patients and treating or referring them. Optimal payment systems are derived that, at the same time, induce GPs to exert diagnosis effort and give incentives for efficient referral or treatment decisions, i.e., GP treatment for low severity diagnoses and referral for high severity diagnoses. 11 This also refers to the second gain of gatekeeping: the allocation of patients to health care sectors improves since patients more appropriately treated by a GP are screened out through costly diagnosing of all patients. On the other hand, as Malcomson (2004) points out, patients who would not otherwise have been referred, may be referred after being subject to costly diagnosis. Again, health care is used more efficiently. In our paper, GPs are -on the one hand -perfect agents in the sense that they truthfully convey the information about the secondary care market that they have, but -on the other hand -imperfect agents in the sense that diagnosing is noisy. Although we consider diagnosing accuracy to be exogenous, it can, in fact, be seen as a result of an incentive contract like the ones derived in the above cited papers. Instead of analyzing whether or not a patient should be referred to a hospital, we consider that all patients will be referred and concentrate on the improved matching of patients to hospitals through gatekeeping GPs. 12 Although important for the social desirability of gatekeeping, this has not been analyzed before. Moreover, we explicitly model the secondary care sector and introduce imperfect competition, and thereby significantly advance the literature. We demonstrate that the information acquired through gatekeeping affects competition amongst secondary care providers and that this may generate -so far neglected -(adverse) effects of such a system. when prices are regulated. They apply a circular model with attention directed towards entry of physicians into the market, so the focus of these papers is clearly quite different from ours. Calem and Rizzo (1995) also analyze horizontal and vertical differentiation of hospitals. However, in contrast to our paper, they neither consider price regulation nor gatekeeping.
9 See, e.g., Varian (1980) , Burdett and Judd (1983) , Lommerud and Sørgard (2003) and Schultz (2004 Schultz ( , 2005 . 10 Another related paper in this strand of the literature is Baye and Morgan (2001) , who analyze the competition effects of information gatekeepers on the Internet, where such gatekeepers create a market for price information by charging fees to firms that advertise prices and to consumers who access the list of advertised prices. 11 Given the optimal contracts, the question of whether a gatekeeping system dominates free access to secondary care is analyzed. Without going into details here, the results are ambiguous.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The basic framework is presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we analyze hospitals' incentives for specialization and quality investments for a given GP attendance rate. In Section 4, we endogenize the GP attendance rate and characterize the corresponding specialization-quality-consultation equilibrium. Section 5 is devoted to welfare effects of gatekeeping and regulation of GP attendance, as well as second-best price regulation. Finally, in Section 6, we provide some concluding remarks.
The model
There is a continuum of patients with mass 1 distributed uniformly along the Hotelling line S = [0, 1]. The location of a patient is denoted z ∈ S and is associated with the disease he suffers from. A disease z can be seen as a realization of a random variable Z which is uniformly distributed on S. All patients need one medical treatment to be cured. There are two health care providers -henceforth called hospitals -both able to cure all diseases. However, they are differentiated with respect to the disease they are best able to cure. Specialization of a hospitalinterpreted as a location on S -is denoted x i , i = 1, 2. Like in Brekke et al. (2006) we make the following assumptions on hospital specializations:
, wherex is a (small) positive number. This is done in order to secure existence of pure strategy equilibria throughout the analysis. As specialization is typically difficult to measure we consider x 1 and x 2 non-contractible. 13 In addition to specialization, there is a second strategic variable used by the hospitals to attract patients, namely the quality of care q i ∈ [q -,q], i = 1, 2, where q -is the minimum quality level allowed by the regulator, and any q i < q -can be thought of as malpractice. Apart from malpractice litigation quality is, due to measurement problems, considered not verifiable in a contractual sense. Without loss of generality we assume that q -= 0. Quality costs are assumed to be symmetric and quadratic, kq 2 i , where k > 0. Placing an upper boundq on quality investments is a (crude) way of capturing that it is insurmountably costly to increase quality beyond a certain level. 14 Quality costs are considered to be fixed, i.e., they are independent of how many patients are actually treated. This implies that quality has the characteristics of a public good at each hospital. Examples of such quality investments are the cost of searching for and hiring more qualified medical staff, additional training of existing medical staff, and investments in improved hospital facilities, which can be related to both medical machinery and non-medical facilities such as room standard. 15 Without loss of generality, other fixed costs are set to zero. Marginal production costs are assumed to be constant and equal to zero. This cost structure stresses the importance of fixed costs, which seems reasonable for the hospital market. 13 One may also argue that, although specialization is non-contractible, the regulator is able to prevent that hospitals locate too closely. From the regulator's perspective too close locations may be undesirable since this would imply duplication of fixed costs without the benefit of diversified hospital services. 14 We can, for instance, think ofq as the best (state-of-the-art) technology or medical procedure available in the market. Thus, increasing quality above this level is not possible. 15 The assumption of production-independent quality costs is widely used in the literature on quality competition in health care markets (see, e.g., Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Lyon, 1999; Gravelle and Masiero, 2000; Barros and Martinez-Giralt, 2002) . Including variable quality costs would obviously imply a more general quality cost structure. However, since prices are fixed in our model, variable quality costs would only weaken the incentives for investing in quality. It can readily be verified that this only complicates the analysis without providing any qualitatively different results. Interested readers may consult Ma and Burgess (1993) for the case of fixed locations or contact the authors for the case of endogenous locations.
The price for one treatment is denoted p ≥ 0 and is set by some regulatory authority. 16, 17 The expected profit of hospital i is given by
where D i is expected demand for hospital i treatment.
Patients derive utility from the quality of hospital care. Furthermore, we assume that a patient's utility is decreasing in the distance between the patient's location (disease) and the location (specialization) of the hospital where (s)he is treated. The utility loss incurred from being treated by a less than perfectly suitable provider of care is referred to as 'mismatch costs'. More specifically, a patient's (ex post) utility when going to hospital i is given by 18
The maximum gross willingness to pay for hospital treatment, v, is assumed to be sufficiently large for the entire market to be covered. Thereby, we preclude monopoly and kink equilibria and concentrate on competitive ones. 19 Notice that this assumption essentially means that all patients have access to hospital or specialist care, which seems reasonable, at least for developed countries (without waiting lists). One may also argue that waiting lists are implicitly modelled as part of the quality decision: a longer list implies lower quality for patients and lower costs for hospitals. 20 The last term measures the mismatch costs incurred -assumed to be quadratically increasing in distance -when treated by hospital i = 1, 2. The parameter t > 0 determines the importance of mismatch costs relative to the quality of care.
Patients are ex ante uninformed about both their own diagnosis and the qualities and specializations of hospitals. They only know v, the distribution of Z, and that hospital treatment is required, but they cannot observe x i , q i and z. For uninformed patients, secondary care is an experience good, and the ex post utility given by (2) can only be learned through actual consumption. However, patients can obtain more information ex ante by consulting a GP before accessing the hospital market. We assume that a GP will convey accurate information about the secondary care market, i.e., hospitals' qualities and specializations, and give the attending patient a diagnosis, i.e., a location on S. This diagnosis is noisy, though. We assume that the GP will provide the correct diagnosis with an exogenous probability δ ∈ (0, 1), which we henceforth term 'diagnosing accuracy'. We then make the simplifying assumption that incorrect diagnoses -that occur with probability (1 − δ) -are uniformly distributed on S. 21 Both the probability of a correct diagnosis and the distribution of incorrect diagnoses are common knowledge. Thus, the GP is a perfect agent in the sense that all information is truthfully conveyed to those patients consulting the GP, but an imperfect agent in the sense that diagnosing accuracy is not perfect. 22 Realistically, there are some individual costs associated with attending a GP to obtain information. To incorporate this, we assume cost heterogeneity with respect to GP consultation, where y ∈ [0, 1] denotes the cost type of a patient. The associated costs are then assumed to be ay, where a > 0. This heterogeneity can simply be justified by an opportunity cost argument, e.g., by varying time costs due to different wage earning abilities. 23 There are no other (direct) costs of gatekeeping. To simplify the analysis we assume that patient types are uniformly distributed on the disease space S. As a result, patients are uniformly distributed on the unit square with the disease (or diagnosis) on one axis and cost type on the other. The share of patients who obtain information through GP consultation is denoted by λ. This share is determined either by free choice (voluntary gatekeeping) or by direct regulation (compulsory gatekeeping).
The available regulatory instruments for a social planner are assumed to be λ and p, while hospital quality as well as hospital specialization are not verifiable in a contractual sense. 24 Regarding regulation on λ, it is -in theory -possible to imagine that the regulator can influence the amount of information available to patients in the market through several different means. We will, however, focus on what is probably the most realistic regulatory instrument, namely introducing a strict gatekeeping regime, where all patients are required to consult a GP before seeking secondary care. Thus, the scope for regulating λ is restricted to setting λ = 1.
The effect of GP gatekeeping to the market for secondary care is analyzed in a five-stage game:
1. The regulator sets her available regulatory variables. These are one or both of p and λ. Regulation on the latter variable is restricted to setting λ = 1. 2. The hospitals simultaneously decide on their specializations,
3. The hospitals simultaneously set their quality levels q 1 ∈ [0,q] and q 2 ∈ [0,q]. 4. Patients choose whether to consult a gatekeeping general practitioner and obtain accurate information about x i and q i , and a diagnosis with accuracy δ < 1. If the regulator introduced compulsory gatekeeping at stage 1, there is no choice patients have to make at this stage of the game. 5. All patients choose a hospital for secondary care treatment.
The sequential structure of the game is argued by the different degree of irreversibility of strategic decisions. Clearly, the decision of whether to consult a gatekeeping GP and/or which hospital to go to is the most flexible decision to be taken in the entire game. Changing quality or specialization requires more effort and investment. In both cases, it may be necessary to replace some medical machinery and/or have the current staff undergo significant training, or even hire new staff. Although it may sometimes be hard to distinguish between quality investments and a 22 The assumption of perfect GP information on hospital characteristics is made for simplification only. The mechanisms of our model are at work as long as GP consultation leads to more information on hospital characteristics. Obviously, the benefit of a gatekeeping system is lower the poorer GP information. 23 Without cost heterogeneity either all patients or no patients would approach a gatekeeping GP.change of specialization, it seems logically consistent to assert that hospitals first decide what to produce (their service or speciality mix), and then determine the quality of services. 25 This sequential structure is common in models that combine horizontal and vertical differentiation (see, e.g., Economides, 1989; Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Bester, 1998; Gravelle, 1999) .
That the regulator can determine λ and p at the beginning of the game essentially means that we consider commitment power on her side. This assumption is, of course, crucial as in most sequential games. With respect to λ, this can easily be justified since introducing a strict gatekeeping system (i.e., setting λ = 1) must be regarded as a major reform of the health care system. This may be less clear with the price. As in Brekke et al. (2006) and Nuscheler (2003) there will be an incentive to reoptimize after specializations have been chosen. Nevertheless, since commitment is valuable for the regulator, one could argue that she should be able to obtain such commitment power, either through reputation or by creating institutional mechanisms that makes it costly, or otherwise difficult, to change the regulated price. 26 In any case, since price regulation is not the major focus of the present paper, we will concentrate on the full commitment case.
Although we have a game of imperfect information (the fraction 1 − λ of the population is uninformed about hospital quality, hospital specialization and about their own disease; the fraction λ(1 − δ) receives accurate quality and specialization information but a wrong diagnosis), subgame perfection is the appropriate solution concept. Note that the standard Nash assumption applies zero conjectural variations, i.e., hospitals optimize their own actions against a given action of the competitor (see, e.g., Bresnahan, 1981) . Moreover, there is no collusion amongst hospitals. 27 We solve the game by backward induction, starting with the demand for hospital care. Hospitals then play their sequential specialization-quality game for a given value of λ. This yields reaction functions x * i (λ) and q * i (λ) for i = 1, 2. This game is analyzed in Section 3. As hospitals have no means to 'signal' their characteristics, neither specializations nor qualities are observed by patients, although hospitals move before patients decide about whether to consult a GP (and obtain information) or not. Therefore, patients have to decide on GP consultation for given values of the hospitals' strategic variables. So, in a game-theoretic sense, consultation decisions are simultaneous to the specialization-quality game. A reaction function λ * (x 1 , x 2 , q 1 , q 2 ) results, and the equilibrium of the specialization-quality-consultation subgame is then, as usual, the intersection of the reaction functions where actions are mutually best responses. This subgame is analyzed in Section 4.
The solution of the full game is relegated to Section 5, where social welfare and price regulation is investigated.
Hospital specialization and quality

The demand for secondary care
A share 1 − λ of the population does not consult a GP, and thus remains uninformed about the actual quality levels and about specializations. Moreover, these patients do not know the exact disease they suffer from. To make a decision about which hospital to approach, patients have to evaluate their expected utility of attending each hospital. As the game is fully symmetric and since
The residual fraction of the population, λ, consults a GP and obtains (perfect) information about hospital characteristics. These patients are responsive to quality investments and specialization decisions, since both strategic variables are observed. Furthermore, the patients consulting a GP receive an imperfect diagnosis. The probability of getting a correct diagnosis is δ and is independent of the disease. If a patient receives a diagnosis z, the probability that he actually suffers from disease z is δ. With the remaining probability, 1 − δ, z is just a draw from the uniform distribution over the unit interval S. Thus, the expected utility of hospital i treatment, for a patient who has received a diagnosis z, is given by
. Then there exists a unique diagnosis,z ∈ [0, 1], such that a patient who receives this diagnosis is, in expectation, indifferent between the two hospitals. This diagnosis is found by solving Eu
1 all patients are -independent of the diagnosis they receive -strictly better off with hospital 2, i.e., hospital 1 gets no demand from informed consumers. If q 1 > q h 1 all patients are strictly better off with hospital 1 treatment. The expected demand for hospital 1 from GP-patients is then given by the expected number of patients who receive a diagnosis z ≤z. Since both true and incorrect diagnoses are uniformly distributed on S, and diagnosing accuracy is the same for all locations, the reported diagnosis is also uniformly distributed on S, implying that the probability of receiving a diagnosis z ≤z isz. The share of informed patients that choose hospital 1 is thus given bȳ
Overall expected demand for hospital 1 is D 1 = λz + (1 − λ)/2. Likez the demand function has kinks at q l 1 and q h 1 . Hospital 2 expects to receive the residual demand
Quality competition
For given locations and given GP attendance, optimal quality investments are found by inserting demand derived above into the profit function (1) and optimizing with respect to q i . We assume that δ > (1/2) −x. For this case, we show in Appendix A that, ifq is not too high, a unique pure strategy equilibrium in the quality game exists for all p > 0 and λ > 0, and for all locations x 1 ∈ [0, 
where Δ:=x 2 − x 1 ∈ [2x, 1]. We see that equilibrium quality levels in the interior solution are always symmetric and depend only on the distance between hospitals' locations. This is due to the absence of price competition, where quality investments have a market-expanding effect which, due to the uniform distribution of patients, does not depend on absolute locations. An immediate implication is that optimal specializations will be characterized by some certain distance and not by absolute locations. Assuming an interior solution, the comparative static results are mostly straightforward. Less product differentiation (lower Δ) will intensify quality competition, i.e., competition is intense when products are close substitutes. Furthermore, patients are more responsive to quality improvements when mismatch costs are small, implying that t is a measure of competition intensity. Not very surprisingly, an increase in the quality cost parameter k has an adverse effect on quality provision. The better medical treatments are paid, the higher are the benefits of capturing market from the competitor. At this stage of the game the only means of competition is the quality of care, and thus hospitals will improve their quality as a response to an increase in p.
The degree of information in the market is captured by the two parameters λ and δ. A higher GP attendance (λ) leads to increased quality provision. This is quite intuitive, since more patients obtain information about hospital qualities and thus become responsive to possible quality differences between the hospitals. Improved diagnosing accuracy, on the other hand, has the opposite effect, which might seem a bit surprising at first glance. 28 The underlying mechanism is that lower diagnosing accuracy makes hospital quality a relatively stronger signal for an imperfectly informed patient. If a patient is less certain about his own location, and thus about the expected mismatch costs of attending each hospital, he will attach more weight to hospital quality in making the decision of which hospital to approach for treatment. In other words, improved diagnosing accuracy means that information about hospital specialization becomes more valuable for the patient. All else equal, a higher value of δ thus reduces the degree of competition in the market and leads to lower quality provision in equilibrium.
Specialization
At this stage of the game hospitals decide on their specialization, taking, for a given λ, the effects on quality competition and demand into account. We look for a symmetric equilibrium in pure strategies. Inserting the optimal quality levels in the interior solution into hospital 1's profit function, we obtain the following partial derivative with respect to x 1 :
As already mentioned, setting ∂Π 1 /∂x 1 = 0 only yields Δ * . There exists a continuum of locations fulfilling x 2 − x 1 = Δ * . Imposing symmetry leads to a unique equilibrium, given by 29
28 Remember that patients receive perfect information about qualities and specializations, while diagnosis information is imperfect. 29 It is easily shown that the second-order conditions are met. Moreover, note that symmetry always implies x 1 + x 2 = 1.
where
In addition, there are two possible corner solutions. If differentiation incentives are very strong, the hospitals will locate at the endpoints, i.e., Δ * = 1. On the other hand, if the upper bound on quality is sufficiently low, the locations given by (7) and (8) will induce a corner solution, q i =q, in the ensuing quality game. In this case, the equilibrium in the location game is a corner solution with minimal hospital differentiation, i.e., Δ * = 2x. In the following, we focus on the interior equilibrium given by (7) and (8). 30 The hospitals' location incentives are governed by two opposing forces. Ceteris paribus, each hospital can obtain a larger share of the market by moving closer to its rival (business stealing effect). On the other hand, closer locations imply that quality competition is intensified, as can be seen from Eq. (5).
Consider an increase in the treatment price p. This will strengthen the business stealing effect, since hospitals now receive a higher mark-up on each treatment. However, a price increase also means that quality competition is amplified. From (8), we see that the latter effect always dominates: a higher price implies that hospitals aim at dampening the resulting increase in quality competition by locating further apart.
A similar mechanism determines the relationship between GP attendance and locations. More informed patients will result in stronger quality competition, and hospitals will respond by differentiating more. 31 A social planner thus faces a trade-off when setting the price or taking measures to improve information in the market. The improved quality has to be weighed against the change in aggregate mismatch costs.
Like in the quality game, increased information about the secondary care market through higher GP attendance and improved diagnosing accuracy yield opposite incentives for hospital competition. Since improved diagnosing accuracy reduces the intensity of quality competition, hospitals choose to differentiate less.
We have already identified the mismatch cost parameter t as a measure of competition intensity. A low t boosts quality provision and -to dampen this effect -hospitals locate further apart. Finally, an increase in the quality cost parameter k reduces quality competition, resulting in less product differentiation. When inserting (8) into (5) we obtain the equilibrium quality levels of the game:
The following proposition summarizes the comparative statics results:
Proposition 1. The best responses of the specialization-quality game are both increasing in treatment price and GP consultation, and decreasing in mismatch costs, quality costs and diagnosing accuracy.
GP consultation
In the previous section we derived the equilibrium of the specialization-quality game for a given value of λ, and Eqs. (7)- (9) show the respective best response functions of the hospitals. To solve the game we now have to derive the best response of patients to any given level of Δ and q. This is done by letting patients make the choice of whether or not to consult a GP to obtain more information, based on an assessment of expected benefits and costs.
When deciding whether to approach a (randomly chosen) hospital directly or to consult a GP first, a patient has to weigh the costs of going to a GP against the benefits. As the game is common knowledge, patients know that hospitals provide the same quality. Moreover, the quality received is independent of whether a GP was consulted or not and therefore the consultation decision is independent of qualities. Determining the (individual) benefits of gatekeeping, and thereby the best response λ * (Δ), simply requires ascertaining the reduction in expected mismatch costs for every degree of product differentiation, Δ, in the market. To simplify the analysis we assume that patients know that the equilibrium will be symmetric, i.e., that hospitals locate equidistantly from the market center, but on opposite sides. 32 For a given degree of differentiation, Δ, expected mismatch costs for a patient who directly approaches a hospital are
The first term of Eq. (10) measures the expected mismatch costs when approaching hospital 1 weighted with the probability that this hospital will actually be chosen (which, applying our tie-breaking rule, is 1/2). Expected mismatch costs are calculated over the entire disease space, since patients are unaware of their actual diagnosis. Accordingly, the second term measures the expected mismatch costs when consulting hospital 2, weighted with 1/2. When consulting a GP first, expected mismatch costs are reduced to
Through GP consultation the patient obtains a diagnosis z and seeks treatment of hospital 1 whenever z ∈ [0, 1 2 ]. The associated expected mismatch costs are given by the first line of Eq. (11). With probability δ the diagnosis z is correct and the corresponding mismatch costs are given by the first term of the integrand (of the outer integral). With the remaining probability 1 − δ the diagnosis z is false. The true disease may be at any point of the unit interval and every disease is equally likely. The resulting mismatch costs are given by the second term, i.e., by the inner integral. If z ∈ ( 1 2 , 1], the patient chooses treatment of hospital 2 and, in expectation, incurs the second line as mismatch costs. The expected benefit of gatekeeping is thus
The best response λ * (Δ) is now obtained by equating the expected benefits of gatekeeping to its actual costs, tδ /4 = ay, and solving for y, which yields the critical cost typeỹ who is indifferent between consulting a GP for diagnosis (and referral) and approaching a hospital directly. Since the cost type is uniformly distributed on the unit interval the share of patients seeking GP diagnosis is ỹ 0 dy =ỹ implying a best response function
The comparative static results can easily explained by the costs and benefits of GP consultation. Of course, the higher consulting cost (a), the lower the share of patients actually attending a GP for consultation. The benefits of gatekeeping are determined by two different factors relating to three different variables or parameters. First, the mismatch costs that, in expectation, can be saved through costly GP consultation are positively related to the degree of horizontal differentiation of services Δ and to the weight t attached to the disease mismatch in the patients' utility function. Thus, the higher tΔ the more costly, in terms of mismatch costs, to approach the 'wrong' hospital. Second, the savings discussed above are realized with a higher probability the more accurate the diagnosis of the GP, i.e., the larger δ.
Let us now turn to the solution of the game. Eqs. (8) and (13) define the two reaction functions which determine the equilibrium attendance rate and differentiation, λ * and Δ * , so that the level of GP attendance is the best response to hospital specializations, and vice versa. Assuming an interior solution for hospital differentiation and GP attendance, the equilibrium values of Δ and λ are found by simultaneously solving (8) and (13), yielding
The corresponding quality levels are obtained by substituting Eq. (15) into (9), yielding
We are now ready to state the comparative static results of the specialization-qualityconsultation subgame:
Proposition 2. The specialization-quality-consultation equilibrium has the following comparative static properties:
(i) GP attendance is increasing in treatment price, mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy, and decreasing in quality and attendance costs; (ii) hospital differentiation is increasing in treatment price, decreasing in mismatch, attendance and quality costs, and independent of diagnosing accuracy; (iii) hospital quality is increasing in treatment price, decreasing in attendance and quality costs, and independent of mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy.
Several of these effects are quite intuitive. The share of the population attending a GP increases in the mismatch cost, t, as this drives up the benefits of gatekeeping. It also increases in the treatment price. This is an indirect effect stemming from specialization. Price increases boost quality competition and, to dampen this effect, hospitals aim at reducing the substitutability of their services, increasing the benefits of gatekeeping. Obviously, λ * is a decreasing function of a. The higher the disutility incurred by consulting a GP, the lower the share of patients who actually consult one. This reduces the competitive pressure in the hospital market, leading to less differentiation and a lower supply of quality. Equilibrium GP attendance is also increasing in the diagnosing accuracy, δ, since improved accuracy reduces expected mismatch costs and thus increases the benefits of GP gatekeeping. Finally, an increase in the quality cost parameter, k, reduces quality competition and thereby differentiation incentives. This, in turn, reduces the benefits of gatekeeping, leading to a lower GP attendance in equilibrium.
There are also some effects that are less obvious. We see that the mismatch costs parameter t has no effect on equilibrium hospital quality. With exogenous GP attendance, patients were more responsive to quality investments at lower values of t, amplifying quality competition. With endogenous GP attendance, however, this effect is counteracted by the consultation effect. A lower t reduces the benefits of gatekeeping, resulting in lower GP attendance and thus a less competitive market. With linear costs of GP consultation and uniformly distributed consultation cost types these two effects exactly offset. Interestingly, we also see that equilibrium hospital specialization and quality provision are not affected by diagnosing accuracy, δ. For a given level of GP attendance, we know that higher diagnosing accuracy reduces the degree of competition in the market, with lower quality provision and less differentiation (direct effect). However, a higher diagnosing accuracy also increases the value of information obtained by attending a GP, leading to higher GP attendance, which, in turn, increases the degree of hospital competition (indirect effect). Thus, when the decision of whether or not to attend a GP is taken into account, the indirect effect of improved diagnosing accuracy on hospital competition tends to counteract the direct effect. In our specific model, with linear GP consultation costs, these two effects exactly offset. Obviously, the indirect effect is eliminated if consultation costs are so low that all patients choose to consult a GP before accessing the hospital market. In this case, the equilibrium is a corner solution with λ * = 1, where improved diagnosing accuracy dampens competition between secondary care providers.
Social welfare
Consider a social planner who aims at maximizing social welfare, defined as the sum of consumers' and producers' surpluses net of any government expenditures. 33 Taking the duopolistic market structure as exogenously given, imposing symmetry, and noting that aggregate GP consultation costs are a λ 0 s ds = (1/2)aλ 2 , expected social welfare is given by
or, when substituting for M 0 and M GP from Eqs. (10) and (11),
The interpretation of (17) is straightforward. In addition to the gross utility of hospital treatment (first term), expected social welfare consists of the social net benefit of quality provision (second term) net of expected aggregate mismatch costs (third term) and aggregate GP consultation costs (fourth term).
Should GP attendance be made compulsory?
Introducing a strict gatekeeping system is equivalent to setting λ = 1. For illustration, let us first assume that the regulator can decide the optimal rate of GP attendance directly, by choosing any λ fb ∈ [0, 1]. From (17), the rate of GP attendance that maximizes social welfare, for a given level of hospital differentiation Δ, is given by
Comparing (18) and (13) we see that, for a given degree of hospital differentiation, private and social incentives for GP attendance coincide. So why should a regulator distort GP consultation? The reason is that, for a given price p, the 'laissez-faire' equilibrium, given by (14), not necessarily produces socially optimal hospital differentiation. Quality provision (16) may also be inefficient. It may therefore be desirable to make GP attendance compulsory, in order to affect both hospital specializations and quality investments in a socially desirable direction, even if this means that GP attendance costs increase beyond the socially (and privately) optimal level.
With voluntary GP consultation, expected social welfare is found by inserting the equilibrium expressions for Δ * (p), λ * (p) and q * (p) from (14)- (16) into the welfare function (17), yielding
If the regulator enforces compulsory GP consultation, expected social welfare is found by setting λ = 1 in the equilibrium expressions for Δ * (λ, p) and q * (λ, p) in (8) and (9), and substituting into the welfare function (17), yielding
Whether or not an introduction of a strict gatekeeping system is (for a given price) socially desirable is then determined by the sign of the difference between (19) and (20) . Unfortunately, it is not feasible to characterize this difference analytically. However, we have done several numerical simulations that produce a clear picture. The details of the simulations are available upon request (see also the supplementary material available in the online version of the paper); here we only summarize the main findings.
It is instructive to express the results with respect to the key parameters t and δ. Our main finding is that enforcing compulsory GP consultation is socially desirable only if t or δ are sufficiently high. Hospital competition is then relatively moderate and insufficient quality and too little hospital differentiation may result. We know that improved patient information in terms of GP consultation (i.e., an increase in λ) increases the degree of competition in the market. The introduction of a strict gatekeeping system thus stimulates competition and may affect both quality and specialization in a socially desirable direction. In contrast, if t or δ are relatively small hospital competition is already strong. Making GP consultation compulsory might then lead to excessive competition with too high quality and too much specialization.
The treatment price as an additional regulatory instrument
The above result hinges on the assumption that the treatment price is exogenous. We will now relax this assumption and assume that the regulator is able also to use the price as a regulatory instrument in an optimal way. Assuming second-best price regulation, the following result obtains: Proposition 3. With second-best price regulation and endogenous GP consultation decisions, there is no scope for direct regulation of GP attendance.
Proof. Inserting (8) and (9) into (17) yields a welfare function W (p, λ). By definingp:=pλ we can define a new welfare functionŴ(p, λ):=W(Δ * (p), q * (p), λ). Maximizing W (p, λ) with respect to p and λ is then equivalent to maximizingŴ(p, λ) with respect top and λ. Taking the partial derivative with respect to λ yields
By comparing (13) and (21) we see that social and private incentives for GP attendance coincide for every given value of Δ. The regulator can then usep to induce the optimal (second-best) levels of q and Δ and let patients choose the socially optimal level of GP attendance themselves.
When second-best pricing is available, there is no longer any need to use strict gatekeeping as a regulatory mechanism to induce socially more desirable hospital differentiation and quality provision. From (8) and (9), we know that p and λ have identical effects on equilibrium differentiation and quality provision. Thus, by using the price instrument properly, the regulator can induce exactly the same specialization-quality outcome for any given value of λ. If the regulator uses the price instrument to induce second-best differentiation and quality provision, an optimal trade-off between expected mismatch cost reductions and consultation costs will secure the socially optimal level of GP attendance. This is exactly the trade-off that patients make themselves in the described game.
The second-best optimum
Let us now derive and characterize the second-best price and briefly discuss the efficiency properties of the optimal solution. 34 We focus on an interior solution, where the optimal price is sufficiently low to ensure q <q. 35 Maximizing (19) with respect to p yields the following second-best treatment price:
The optimal price is increasing in diagnosing accuracy, although δ does not affect quality and specializations in equilibrium. The reason is that higher diagnosing accuracy increases the degree of information about hospital specializations in the market, implying that the socially optimal differentiation is larger. The regulator must then stimulate more differentiation by increasing the treatment price. The effects of the consultation and mismatch cost parameters a and t are more straightforward. An increase in either type of cost dampens hospital competition, leading to less differentiation and lower quality provision, effects that can by counteracted by increasing p.
From the price given in (22), the following equilibrium outcome obtains:
The efficiency properties of the second-best interior solution 36 are summarized as follows:
Proposition 4. The second-best (interior) solution of the specialization-quality-consultation game has the following efficiency properties: Proof. First-best specialization, Δ fb = λδ/2, and first-best quality, q fb = (1)/(4k), is obtained by partially differentiating Eq. (17) with respect to Δ and q, respectively. From (23), we find that
and
The first-best outcome with respect to both hospital differentiation and quality provision isapart from the knife-edge case (ii) -never achieved. This is not surprising, since the regulator has more policy goals than regulatory instruments.
To see the intuition for the general efficiency characteristics of the second-best equilibrium, consider regimes (i) and (iii), where the benefits of gatekeeping are either low or high compared to its costs. In the former case, GP attendance will be low in equilibrium and social welfare is maximized at a relatively low degree of differentiation. Consequently, the price that yields first-best 36 It is straightforward to show that second-best pricing yields an interior solution with respect to GP attendance for a subset of the parameter values, defined by k >k, wherē
Thus, if k ≤k we have a corner solution with λ sb = 1, implying a de facto strict gatekeeping regime.
differentiation is not high enough to generate efficient quality provision. Higher quality can then only be obtained at the expense of excessive differentiation, and these considerations are optimally traded off at a price which yields under-provision of quality and too much differentiation. In the latter case, though, GP attendance and thus the first-best level of differentiation are relatively high. The optimal degree of differentiation is then obtained at a price that yields over-provision of quality. Consequently, optimal regulation implies accepting a less than optimal degree of differentiation in order to avoid too much over-investment in quality.
Concluding remarks
Equipping GPs with a gatekeeper role in the health care system is a major issue in the debate on health care reforms. Among politicians, the conventional wisdom is that gatekeeping contributes to cost control. This is somewhat surprising since evidence is lacking, as was demonstrated in an empirical study by Barros (1998) . As GPs are usually better informed than patients about the characteristics of the secondary health care market, e.g., about quality and specialization of hospitals, matching of patients to hospitals may be improved by gatekeeping. However, this argument neglects the potential competitive effects in the hospital market. We have presented a model that analyzes the competitive effects of gatekeeping in the presence of hospital non-price competition.
While prices were regulated, we allowed for competition in specialization and quality. We found that when the price is exogenously given, strict gatekeeping may reduce social welfare, especially if mismatch costs and diagnosing accuracy are both sufficiently low. In this case, making it compulsory to attend a GP before receiving secondary care will boost competition to such an extent that excessive hospital specialization and quality occur. This raises doubts about whether gatekeeping improves efficiency. Things change when allowing for second-best price regulation. In this case, we showed that there is no scope for direct regulation of GP attendance, since consultation decisions of patients are the same as what a social planner would implement. Actually, a de facto strict gatekeeping regime arises endogenously if the benefits of gatekeeping are sufficiently high (improved matching outweighs the potentially negative competitive effects) compared to its costs. Finally, we considered the (interior) second-best equilibrium, showing that the solution, in general, will be characterized by inefficient levels of quality and specialization, depending on the relative values of mismatch costs, consultation costs and the diagnosing accuracy. GP consultation, however, was found to be efficient given specializations of hospitals.
The analysis demonstrates that efficiency gains that are usually attributed to GP gatekeeping cannot be taken for granted when the secondary care sector is endogenized and non-price competition amongst providers is considered. In the short run, efficiency gains may indeed be obtained by better matches. However, quality provision may still be inefficient. In the long run, hospitals will adjust their specialization so that differentiation increases, which might counteract the positive short run effect.
We have assumed a prospective payment system, where the regulator sets the price per treatment. This payment system corresponds well with DRG-pricing systems, which are extensively used by several countries as a way to reimburse hospitals for their medical treatments. The DRGprice is based on the average cost of treating particular diagnostic groups, where the average cost is derived from reported costs by a representative sample of hospitals. An alternative mechanism is to give hospitals budgets (block grants) based on capitation, which is a payment per individual enrolled in a given health plan (or district). The capitation payment is based on the expected overall costs of treating the individuals in the health plan, which depends on the distribution of diseases, the corresponding probabilities of falling ill, and the treatment costs. In our model there is no uncertainty with respect to health status. Every individual is ill and in need for one unit of care. As a consequence, the regulated price can be interpreted either as a payment per treatment (e.g., DRG-price) or per individual (capitation). As long as the hospitals are not able to affect the payment per patient nor the probability of falling ill, our results can be generalized to also include capitation systems. However, if the hospitals can manipulate the payment per patient by, for instance, upcoding or cream-skimming activities, capitation systems need a separate analysis. This is left for future research.
